Knowledge and Information Economy, Welfare and governance: the economic nature of Intellectual Property Rights by Herscovici, Alain
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alain  Herscovici.  Knowledge  and  Information  Economy,  Welfare  and  governance:  the  economic  nature  of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Механізм регулювання економіки, 2009, № 3, Т. 1  72 
УДК 007:33 
 
Alain Herscovici
* 
 
Knowledge and Information Economy, Welfare and governance: 
the economic nature of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
This paper will study the different conceptions about economic nature of (Intelectual) Property 
Rights,  and  the  implications  in  regard  to  Welfare.  This  analysis  may  be  applied  in  various  fields 
concerned with intangible components: ecology, cultural goods, knowledge and information production, 
internet economics, for example. In regard to the complexity of these types of intangible capital, I will 
show the limits of the private negotiation inspired in Coase´s approach, and underline the opposition 
between this approach and the Williamson´s one. 
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This paper intends to study the analytical relationship between the Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) economic nature and the concrete governance modalities used to manage these IPR. 
This  problematic  may  be  extended  to  the  economic  analyze  of  Property  Rights  (PR)  in 
general, and is related to various social fields: the environmental components, the cultural 
goods and services, the knowledge production and the digital economy, for example. 
 
In a first part, from stylized facts, I will show how the market private logic translates high 
transaction  costs,  i.e.  transaction  costs  generally  higher  than  the  ones  produced  by  other 
governance mechanisms. Then, from the opposition between Pigou and Coase, I will study the 
different conceptions of the PR economic nature, and of the market regulations recommended. 
In a second part, I will point out, in regard to the goods and services complexity, the private 
negotiation  limits,  i.e.  the  coasian  approach  limits;  for  that  purpose,  I  will  use  amply 
Williamson´s theoretical instrumental to demonstrate that the market logic translates a high 
level transaction costs, and I will formalize some of these economic relations: I will show why 
the private negotiation may be inefficient, in regard to traditional maximization process, to 
technological cost and to free-rider behavior. 
 
I) Some stylized facts: the different interpretations 
 
1) The IRP economic nature 
 
1.1 Some tendencies 
 
From the 80 until today, we can observe that there doesn´t exist positive correlation between 
the patents deposited quantity and the R&D expenditure (Lebas, 2002, p. 252). Consequently, 
it  is  possible  to  affirm  that  the  extension  of  DPI  doesn´t  correspond  to  an  incitement  to 
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develop the technological innovation; so, there is, in the contemporaneous capitalism, a IPR 
economic nature and function modification. 
 
The different firms practice a patents portfolio strategy which may be characterized by the 
following elements: 
 
i) The patent is not any more conceived as a way to appropriate temporary rents related to 
technological innovation (Idem, p. 254), the secret is preferred to the divulgation. The secret is 
related to important size firms. 
 
ii) The patent function consists to prevent the potential outsiders entrance on the market: the 
patents systems doesn´t constitute a mean to divulgate the innovation in a cheapest way, but a 
mean to increase the firms market power which have reached a critical size. The entry barriers 
instauration translates  by  a  competition  decrease,  to  the  extent  that  IPRs  are related  with 
process and not with products. 
 
The outsiders are object of a hold-up strategy, from the insiders: these insiders constitute a 
closed network in which they exchange their respective IRP; by this way, they construct entry 
barriers to protect their differential vantages, in regard to outsiders firms. 
 
Moreover,  such  market  structures  imply  in  an  increased  uncertainty  in  regard  to  patents 
valorization: the firm A patent depends of the B and C patents, and of B and C possibilities to 
prevent A patent registration. This situation is characterized by a oligopoly or games theories, 
in the way that A strategy depends of A anticipations about B and C strategies. The dynamical 
efficiency isn´t verified inasmuch there is not more incitation to innovate; the static efficiency 
too isn´t verified inasmuch the technology costs increase means a social welfare decrease.  
 
1.2 The structures markets implications 
 
The patent value depends of the anticipated product that the innovation may produce for the 
rights holder. Until the 80, when patents were related with specific products, it was quite easy 
to anticipate patents revenues. The patent utility depended of its industrial and commercial 
applications, which were identifiable. 
 
Today, patents are related with discoveries, and not only with inventions: in fact, they are 
related with process and not only with identifiable inventions: it means that property rights are 
conceded to generic process virtual applications. By nature, it is impossible to anticipate these 
future applications. The firms constitute patents portfolios: an increasing part of their assets is 
constituted by this kind of intangible capital.  
 
This must be interpreted as an important market power extension: the property rights new 
systems  permits  a  power  monopole  more  important,  inasmuch  this  power  is  related  with 
scientific  and/or  technological  generic  principles  whose  concrete  applications  aren´t 
identifiable.  
 
In these markets, the externalities produced by the technical progress are internalized within 
closed or semi-closed networks: these entry barriers limit the social appropriation of these  
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externalities and the technical progress cumulative character. This kind of strategies and the 
Property Right fragmentation may be interpreted as market failures (see the formalization of 
this mechanism in the last section). 
 
The  anti-commons  (Heller  et  Eisenberger,  1998)  appear  when  knowledge  is  fragmented 
between various Property Rights holders. We can consider a technological process constituted 
by two complementary segments a and b. If, for example, there are two PR holders, A and B, 
and if A decreases its price, A and B demand will increase, although B doesn´t decrease its 
price. So, the PR price necessary to use the technological process will be higher in this case, in 
relation to the situation where there is only one PR holder. These externalities demand 
1 will 
produce  coordination  failures,  and  will  result  in  a  Welfare  decrease  corresponding  to  the 
higher price, in regard to the competitive price. This situation is characterized by sub-additive 
costs  and  may  be  compared  with  the  monopoly  traditional  analyze,  inasmuch,  in  certain 
conditions, the monopoly price is the lowest one. 
 
Finally, when there is an indivisible public good, a common good in a determined community 
(common  knowledge,  ecological  components,  etc.),  private  appropriation  modalities  may 
prejudice the whole collectivity: the result may be a decrease of the stock available for the 
other agents and, in regard to the cumulative character of the production, a decrease of the 
total production growth. Applied to scientific and technological production, a such predatory 
behavior  may  conduce  to  a  production  innovation  growth  decrease;  inasmuch,  the 
privatization of the Scientific and Technological knowledge may produce a such result 
2.  
 
1.3 IPR and new property forms 
 
The digital economy development is characterized by a double movement: the transformation 
of the goods and services economic nature, and a transformation of the IPR forms. 
 
On  one  hand,  more  part  of  these  goods  and  services  are  public  goods,  whose  principal 
characteristics are the non exclusion and the indivisibility. The economic dynamic consists in 
internalizing  the  network  externalities  that  appear  on  these  markets.  In  regard  to  such 
specificities, it is not possible to maximize microeconomic profit function equaling marginal 
cost and marginal product (Herscovici, 2008): these markets aren´t walrasian ones, and its 
dynamic doesn´t consist in selling private goods on the market, but to negotiate the access 
modalities to the networks, to “capture” the consumers/users, and to differentiate the public in 
regard to the different groups propensity to pay (Idem). 
On the other hand, these goods are experience goods (Varian, 2003): so, the price system 
cannot  transmit  all  the  necessary  qualitative  information  for  the  consumer.  Other  social 
mechanisms must do it, to compensate the system price failure: institutions, communities on 
line in regard to digital economy, and so on.  
These new strategies consist in developing, in a first time, free, or quasi free services for the 
consumers: this mechanism permits to create the network and the externalities corresponding, 
and  to  divulgate  the  necessary  information  that  the  prices  system  hides  (Akerlof  and  the 
lemons market, 1970). There are various examples which illustrate this kind of strategy: 
                                                 
1 They are close to the externalities of demand defined by Mankiw.  
2 In this sense, Nelson (2003) underlines the danger of such system, in regard to the Bayle Dole Act, in United 
States.   
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i) Various software producers turn available, during a limited period, a determinate software. 
ii)  Some  economic  studies  determine  the  piracy  level  which  is  able  to  maximize  the 
producer´s profit. 
 
iii) All the free software (as Linux, for example, but Google, too) are other examples. 
 
iv) Finally, in regard to the immateriality of the diffusion support, in the case of the peer to 
peer networks, more particularly in the musical sector, it is not possible any more to control 
and to limit the piracy (Herscovici, 2007). 
 
v) Finally, new collective IPR forms appear: the various kinds of copy-left may be interpreted 
as collective property form. The same phenomenon is observed with the creative commons. 
 
We observe a contradictory movement about the IPR system structuring. On one hand there is 
a relaxation of the IPR system, with the development of collective forms of property, and with 
the development of the piracy. This movement can by explained from the economic nature and 
market dynamic evolution, as the result of new competitive forms emergence. 
 
But, on the other hand, there is a considerable extension of the private IPR system: (a) the IRP 
system  is  applied  to  new  social  fields:  biotechnologies,  scientific  knowledge,  software 
algorithms and pollution rights (b) with the Bayle Dole Act, public institutions may negotiate 
the product of scientific researches (c) these rights are negotiated within a private logic, on the 
base of market mechanisms (Coriat,2002). In fact, we can observe a privatization of part of 
immaterial  and  scientific  production,  in  the  sense  they  aren´t  not  any  more  directly 
administered by institutions. In this way, part of these productions is conceived as private 
goods, and no more as patrimonial goods (Herscovici, 1997). 
 
2) Externalities and Intellectual Property Rights: Pigou versus Coase 
 
2.1 IPR economic specificities and pigouvian approach 
 
IPRs are a mechanism which permits to turn endogenous the externalities produced by some 
types of commodities like Knowledge and Information. In the case of industrial commodities, 
because of their economic characteristics, it is relatively easy to implement a property right 
mechanism, to implement price exclusion mechanisms and divisibility. For instance, in regard 
to  Knowledge  and  Information,  the  problem  is  quite  different:  these  commodities  are 
characterized by no rivalry, by non exclusion and by their cumulative character. 
 
i) The non rivalry may  be explained by the consumption indivisibility: the good does not 
“disappear”  in  the  consumption  process.  It  may  be  consumed,  in  its  completeness,  in  a 
simultaneity, by other consumers. 
 
ii)  The  non  exclusion  means  that  it  is  impossible  to  control  the  various  appropriation 
modalities  of  the  service  provided  by  the  commodity.  In  other  words,  the  commodity 
produces, intrinsically, externalities which benefit either the agents who don´t contribute for 
its production.  
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iii) Finally, the production is cumulative in the way the actual production depends of the initial 
stock of knowledge available today. This dimension outlines the interdependency between the 
different producers, and the dangers of a “closed” IPR system (Neslon, 2003).  
The  IPR  mechanism  applied  to  this  kind  of  goods  will  be  specific,  in  function  of  these 
economic  specificities;  in  this  regard,  Arrow  (2000),  outlines  the  retro-ingenerie  process 
which characterizes this kind of commodity. The efficiency of the IPR system depends of the 
possibilities it offers to turn endogenous these externalities. 
 
In fact, it is possible to distinguish two concepts of externalities: the first one may be called 
pigouvian, and  comes  from  Pigou´s  analyzes.  In  this  perspective,  the  externalities are not 
transferable from an agent to other one; in this case, the endogeneization is implemented out 
of the market, based on an “administrative” mechanism. Two remarks are important: first, the 
externalities are, by nature, technological, as they don´t appear on the market (Benard, 1985); 
secondly, in regard to this characteristic, they cannot be negotiated on the market. So, they 
will be negotiated within an institutional mediation. 
 
This  institutional  mechanism  consists  in  taxing  the  agent  who  produced  the  negative 
externality, to compensate the disutility of the agents victims of this externality. It is possible 
to  establish  rules  to  end  with  the  externality  cause.  In  this  perspective,  externalities  are 
conceived as market failures, which result from the divergence between private and social 
interest. The optimal pollution level is that one which equalizes the marginal profit of the 
polluter with its marginal cost plus the pigouvian tax. 
 
This approach is based upon the collective interest primacy: the existence of pure public goods 
translates  the  fact  that  a  private  appropriation  of  these  public  goods  produces  negative 
externalities; in this case, some agents have to support negative externalities, and the situation 
is not any more Pareto optimal. These public goods are patrimonial goods (Herscovici, 1997), 
and the social interest consists in limiting its private appropriation modalities: the urban laws, 
the environmental regulations or the arts laws are based on such principles. The internalization 
modalities  lead  to  institutional  interventions  to  neutralize  the  effects  of  the  private 
appropriation. 
 
The  Pareto  criterion  is  used  to  guide  these  interventions;  one  state  may  be  called  Pareto 
superior (S1) when no agent prefers the anterior state S, and at least one agent prefers S1. This 
criterion  corresponds  to  distributive  goals,  in regard  to  utility  and  to  income  distribution. 
Finally, the transaction costs related with the public or institutional administration are ignored; 
the coasian approach will focus this point to elaborate his critic. 
 
2.2 The coasian Social Cost Theory  
 
The  new  institutionnal  school,  inspired  in  Coase´s  analyze,  use  other hypothesis  an  other 
axiomatic: 
 
First, it doesn´t exist divergences between private rationality and collective welfare. On the 
contrary, when externalities appear, the most efficient regulation consists in a Property Rights 
(PR) private negotiation between the agents. The externality is not conceived any more as a  
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market failure but, on the contrary, as the result of the absence of a market mechanism, i.e. the 
absence of private negotiation. In opposition with Pigou´s analyze, the externality is the result 
of PR failure. The solution consists in extending the market logic to social activities which can 
be  negotiated  in  a  private  way,  and  which  can  be  patented  (Berg  2003,  Brousseau  2003, 
Guerrien 1999). 
 
This implies that (a) the PR are transferable (b) the PR system may be clearly defined and that 
(c) the agents rationality may implement a substantive rationality. The first criterion implies 
that the PR are negotiable on a market, and that it is possible to quantify them; the second that 
the object of PR may be defined without any ambiguity. The third criterion means that there is 
not uncertainty about the asset value and about the other agents´ behavior; in regard to agents´ 
behavior, all the types of information asymmetries constitute a limit to the concrete realization 
of  a  substantive  rationality  (Saussier  Yvrandre  Brillon,  2007,  Williamson,  2002);  in  other 
words, in Coase´s approach, the contracts are complete, in relation with the hypothesis of 
substantive rationality.  
 
The PR are conceived as the possibility to use one specific production factor, and to produce 
the negative externalities which result from this use (Coase, 1960, p. 22). The PR are defined 
in terms of availability, and no more in terms of property (Kirat, 1999, p. 65), in the traditional 
sense. 
 
The  efficiency  criterion  is  different  of  the  one  s  used  by  the  pigouvian  economy:  it 
incorporates  the  production  or  utility  maximization,  and  ignores  the  income  distribution 
implications. 
 
In this regard, Coase affirms that “« Pigou is, of course, quite right to describe such actions as 
« uncharged disservices ». But he is wrong when he describes these actions as « anti-social » » 
(1960, p. 18).”. This means that Welfare is conceived only in regard to total production and/or 
utility. The criterion used is the Kaldor-Hicks´one. If A realizes a profit equal at 100, but if 
this activity produces a disutility equal a 30, and if A pays 30 to B, this situation is a Pareto 
optimal one. On one hand, neither agent prefers the anterior state; on other hand, the total 
utility net growth is equal at 70. However, in this situation, there are no transaction costs. 
 
The problem is different when we introduce transaction costs: if,  for example, in the last 
example, the transaction costs are equal at 80, there are two solutions:  
 
i) If the compensation is realized, the total utility (or production) reduction is equal at 10. 
 
ii) If the compensation isn´t realized, the production increase is equal at 70. However, the 
inequalities are more important between the polluters and the polluted. And the situation isn´t 
any more a Pareto´s optimum. The inequalities become more and more important; the Kaldor-
Hicks´criterion only considers the PR allocation efficiency and its impact on production level. 
 
This kind of allocation of PR is possible only if the following hypothesis are verified:  
 
i) The different agents´ PR are totally identifiable and have a monetary equivalent 
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ii) They are transferable from one agent to other one. 
 
iii) The different opportunist behaviors are controlled, and don´t imply in high transaction 
costs.  
 
The market solution is, naturally, considered as the most efficient one: this means that the 
transaction cost are less high than they would be in an “institutional” situation, and that the 
situation is efficient, in regard to the criterion chosen. 
 
II) The coasian approach limits: an other institutional alternative 
 
1) Complexity and private mechanism limits 
 
We can point out various limits to the coasian analyze, in regard to the hypotheses related to 
the commodities economic nature and to the behavior agents: 
 
i) The goods can´t be specific, in Williamson´s sense: if the goods are specific, the transaction 
costs level necessary to contain the uncertainty may be high (Williamson, 2000). In other 
words, when the assets are specific, the market does not constitute, systematically, the more 
efficient mechanism to internalize the externalities. For the same level of assets specificities, it 
is  necessary  to  compare  the  transaction  costs  level  which  characterizes  each  kind  of 
governance: the private one, the intra-firm integration, the public (or institutional) one, the 
hybrid ones, and all forms of community governance.  
 
The specificity may be defined from the following characteristics: (a) the irreversibility asset, 
in the way it cannot be the object of multiple uses; the investment represents irreversible costs 
and cannot be used to produce other types of goods (b) the relationships between supply and 
demand are highly individualized; there is a bilateral dependency between buyers and sellers. 
In regard to IPR, in function of the production cumulative character, it is possible to speak in 
multilateral  dependency.  These  specificities  explain  the  behavioral  uncertainty  which 
characterizes these markets.  
 
ii) Part of the goods are experience goods; the prices system does not transmit, freely, the 
qualitative characteristics. The uncertainty related to these qualitative characteristics must be 
compensated by other mechanisms: a brand name strategy, share information communities, 
and so on. This kind of mechanism, necessary to the market coordination, translates some type 
of transaction costs related to the differentiation strategies, to the formation and coordination 
of share information communities, or to monitoring activities
3. These markets are no walrasian 
ones, in the way that the transaction costs are positive, in the way that the prices system does 
not transmit, in a free way, all the information necessary to implement the transactions.  
 
iii) The agents´ behavior is characterized by various types of information asymmetries: on one 
hand, the relationships between producers and consumers don’t permit to evaluate the good 
utility  or  the  asset  marginal  product.  The  prices  system  is  noisy  and  can  divulgate  false 
                                                 
3 The communities on line developpment, for example.  
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information related to quality (Akerlof, 1970). Consequently, it is not possible to maximize 
microeconomic utility or profit functions, neither to determinate the precise extend of PR.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  these  goods  are,  at  least  partially,  non  exclusive  and  non  rival.  The 
opportunist behavior possibilities appear. The club operating may be prejudiced by the free 
rider behaviors
4; it is a form of moral hazard. Finally, the producer can use the system price to 
transmit false quality informations (idem). 
 
Differently  from walrasian approach (the central auctioneer), or from rational expectations 
theory (continued market clearing hypothesis), for the new institutional economy, the central 
problem is that one related with market coordination mechanisms, in the way the walrasian 
natural adjustment does not work anymore. 
 
We  can  observe  two  positions:  Coase  maintains  the  substantive  rationality  and  the  non 
specificities goods hypothesis, and advocates the market mechanism market to negotiate the 
PR. This means, in ultimate instance, that the contracts are complete and that, in this universe, 
there  is  no  uncertainty;  in  this  way,  he  maintains  a  relationship  with  the  neoclassical 
framework.  On  the  contrary,  Williamson´s  analyze  constitutes  a  rupture  in  regard  to  the 
neoclassical/walrasian construction, in the way he does not adopt the substantive rationality 
and the ergotic hypothesis: the agents´ rationality is limited and the contracts are intrinsically 
incomplete.  
 
Finally, we must examine the causal relationship between assets and goods specificities from 
one hand, and opportunist behaviors and coordination mechanisms, from other hand. From the 
perspective developed in this paper, it is possible to affirm the economic nature of the goods 
and services modifications implie in market mechanisms transformations, in new behaviors 
and an new coordination modalities. 
 
How is-it possible to define this complexity? This concept is a multidimensional one:  
i) in regard to the production knowledge cumulatively, the complexity may be defined by the 
uncertain  economic  valorization:  hold-up  strategies  are  commons  and  result  in  uncertain 
valorization. 
 
ii) The PR concept was extended to process and is not any more limited to inventions. It is 
nearly  impossible  to  identify  all  the  possible  applications  of  a  determinate  process; 
consequently, it is impossible to anticipate the marginal product of this asset, and to identify 
all  these  possible  applications,  as  shows  the  juridical  conflicts  in  sectors  intensive  in 
knowledge (software and pharmaceutical industry, for example). 
 
iii) In regard to consumption, the complexity and the quantity of information and knowledge 
embedded in theses goods, are so important that is not possible any more to evaluate ex-ante, 
the  utility.  Moreover,  this  utility  depends  on  the  social  consumers´  differentiated  tacit 
knowledge. 
 
                                                 
4 See Herscovici 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alain  Herscovici.  Knowledge  and  Information  Economy,  Welfare  and  governance:  the  economic  nature  of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Механізм регулювання економіки, 2009, № 3, Т. 1  80 
The theoretical and empirical consequences are the following ones: the agents rationality is, 
intrinsically, bounded. These limits can be explained by the products complexity.  
i) The universe is characterized by uncertainty. Some authors speak in behavioral uncertainty 
(Saussier  Yvrandre  Brillon,  2007),  in  function  of  the  uncertainty  which  characterizes  the 
impossibility to anticipate the agents´ behaviors. At this respect, the theory games shows that 
the equilibrium is not a Pareto´s one. This uncertainty is too an epistemic one and looks like 
the strong uncertainty in the post-keynesian definition. This uncertainty is related too to the 
economic valorization asset and so, to its marginal product. 
ii) The contracts are incomplete, in regard to this complexity, in the way it cannot anticipate 
all the possible “states of the universe”, may be in terms of agents´ behaviors, may be in terms 
of capital marginal product. 
 
In fact, it is possible to affirm that the goods and services complexity is a permissive condition 
in regard to opportunist behavior development. Moreover, the impossibility to implement an 
efficient IPR system amplify this tendency; finally, the coordination problem are fundamental, 
as show the communities on line different economic studies (Curien N., Fauchart E., Laffond 
G. and Moreau F., 2005). 
 
This complexity concept looks like Williamson´s assets specificities, as I shall show it. The 
“neoclassical” approach only considers production costs, i.e. doesn´t consider the transaction 
costs related with market mechanisms; this analyze can´t be applied to complex goods as IPR.  
 
2) The Williamson´s alternative 
 
2.1 Transaction costs and governance 
 
The  question  is,  for  Williamson,  to  establish,  inside  the  market  rules,  a  positive  relation 
between  the  assets  specificities  and  the  amount  of  transaction  costs  (Williamson,  2002). 
Opposite to the standard neo-classical analysis
5, Williamson' work asserts that the market rules 
defined by Walras don´t produce, systematically a first best, in so far as they don't surely lead 
to a Pareto efficiency. Williamson establishes that each type of assets, according to its own 
level of specificity, is related to a specific type of regulation which minimizes transaction 
costs: “ Transaction costs economizing is the unifying concept (Williamson, 2000, p. 180). 
 
Specific assets present an irreversible feature : these costs are irreversible in so far as they 
can't be the object of multiple uses (Saussier, Yvrande-Billon, 2007, p. 18). Opposite to the 
neo-classical  market,  which main  feature  is  to  deal  with anonymous  supply  and  demand, 
concerning  this  type  of  transactions,  the  agents  relationships  are  strongly  individualized 
(Williamson ,2002, p. 176 ). A bilateral dependence arises between buyers and sellers, in so 
far as their relationships are defined in a contract compatible with the IPR system in force. 
 
M represents the market governance, H the hierarchic governance, and X an hybrid form; s 
represents the transaction costs, and k the asset specificity. This graphics shows clearly that 
                                                 
5  By  standard  neoclassical  analysis,  I  mean  the  approaches  which  use  substantive  rationality  hypothesis  and 
optimal adjustment realized by markets. This conception looks like Favereau´s one (1990).   
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the market governance doesn´t correspond, systematically, to a costs transaction minimization. 
Beyond a certain specificity level (k1), other regulations are more efficient. 
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Sources: Williamson, 2002. 
 
Figure 1. Assets specificities and transaction costs 
 
Intangible assets specificities are the following ones: 
 
i) These assets are related to a specific Knowledge that IPR system tries to protect. 
 
ii) Important investments are realized in specific direction: according to the cumulative feature 
peculiar to this kind of activities, they can't be used to produce other types of goods or services 
(dedicated assets, Williamson, 2002, p. 176).Theses types of transactions are, consequently, 
irreversible. 
 
iii)  Finally,  the  economic  recovery  of  this  type  of  assets  is  a  random  one  and  implies 
uncertainty: the strategic or behavioral uncertainty (Saussier, Yvrande-Billon, 2007, p. 20) is 
coming from asymmetric information relative to the different agents' behavior, ex-post, as 
well as to the strategies they can develop. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alain  Herscovici.  Knowledge  and  Information  Economy,  Welfare  and  governance:  the  economic  nature  of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Механізм регулювання економіки, 2009, № 3, Т. 1  82 
Intangible assets, and IPR above all, are highly specific assets, and thus, submitted to a strong 
uncertainty : subsequently, actors' rationality is limited and contracts are, naturally incomplete. 
 
2.2 The different kinds of governance.  
 
We must also consider the existing relationship between the nature of contracts, the assets 
distinctiveness and uncertainty. The more specific are the assets, the more important is the 
uncertainty related to their economic valorization; a way to reduce uncertainty can consist in 
arising transaction costs. However, we must consider, more deeply, in what way transaction 
costs would permit to reduce this uncertainty. 
 
In the framework of a neo-classical analysis, asset is no specific, transaction costs are null and, 
thus, the market is efficient. On the contrary, when asset is specific, transaction costs are 
increasing and the best  way to minimize theses costs  consists in developing an intra-firm 
integration,  a  public  management  or  an  hybrid  form  (  Williamson,  2000,  p604  ).  It  is 
interesting to observe that, in case of a competitive market , more important is the uncertainty, 
higher  is  the  asset  price:  thus,  the  asset  offer-price  incorporates  a  risk  premium  (Idem). 
Transaction  costs  are  including:  safeguard  clauses,  penalties,  asymmetries  of  information, 
control systems, and costs related to conflicts resolution by an external authority (Williamson, 
2002, p. 183). 
 
Then,  choosing  a  mode  of  governance  depends  on  the relation  between  the  price  arising, 
because of a strong uncertainty, and the transaction costs necessary to reduce this uncertainty. 
If transactions costs are more important than the lost of collective welfare, the competitive 
market is the best governance solution; if transaction costs remain less important than the lost 
of  collective  welfare, then another type  of regulation is required. In that way, regulations 
specific to digital economy aren't systematically those defined by Walras´ framework; they 
require other modes of production and distribution for goods and services : networks, clubs or 
other types of community governance. 
 
3) Some formalization 
 
3.1 Coase´s theorem and efficiency criterion 
 
The Coase theorem, in the way it was presented by Stigler, may be formalized in the following 
way: 
 
Capital Marginal Product ≥ pigouvian taxes + capital marginal cost                   (1) 
Pigouvian taxes ≥ disutility                                                     (2) 
 
The relation (1) means that the polluter will increase his production until his marginal product 
be equal to the marginal cost plus the pigouvian taxes; in other words, the capital marginal 
product is decreasing, and the capital marginal cost is creasing.  
 
The relation (2) means that the polluted will accept the pigouvian tax as far as this tax is 
superior or equal to his disutility. 
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In regard to this approach, in the Coase theorem, the transaction costs are equal to zero.  
 
The choice of a maximization criterion may be expressed by the following relations: 
M Pr = pigouvian tax +  Mc                                                     (3) 
 
Pigouvian tax = disutility                                                       (4) 
 
(with MPr as the marginal product and Mc as the marginal costs) 
 
The Pareto criterion is related simultaneously, to (3) and (4): it means that the PR allocation 
maximizes the total welfare and the income distribution. 
 
On the contrary, the Kaldor-Hicks´ criterion only considers (3): if MPr is inferior to pigouvian 
tax  plus  MC,  the  total  product  won´t  increase.  In  this  kind  of  situation,  the  product  will 
increase only if the MPr is superior to all the costs supported by the polluter firm. For that 
reason, the pigouvian tax will not be systematically implemented: in that way, the Mpr will be 
superior  to  the  costs  and  so,  the  total  product  will  increase.  The  fact  to  eliminate  the 
redistribution problem, by  eliminating the pigouvian tax, is the only  way to increase total 
product.  
 
3.2 The private negotiation limits: the inefficient situations 
 
3.2.1 Moreover, the necessary conditions to implement a private negotiation are the following 
ones: it must be possible (a) to evaluate the polluter´s marginal product and (b) the polluted´s 
disutility. 
 
I will show why it is impossible to concretely implement a private negotiation: 
 
i) In the way the goods and services are complex, in the sense I defined this concept, the 
speculative  dimension  doesn´t  permit  to  evaluate,  ex-ante,  the  capital  marginal  product; 
consequently,  it  is  impossible  to  evaluate  the  marginal  product  and  so  to  maximize  the 
production function. 
 
ii) In a similar perspective, if we consider that the rationality is bounded, in the Simon´s sense, 
it is not possible to evaluate all the negative and positive externalities related to this kind of 
capital; consequently, it is not possible to evaluate the polluted´s disutility; 
 
3.2.2 The  maximization  mechanism implies  that  the marginal  product  must  be  decreasing 
(relation  (3)).  On  the  contrary,  the  knowledge  production  is  cumulative:  so,  its  marginal 
product is increasing
6, and the traditional maximization mechanism is not any more valid. 
 
It  is  possible  to  make  the  following  observations:  the  Coase´s  analyzes  limits  may  be 
explained in regard to the intangible capital economic specificities, which are ignored in this 
approach.  
 
                                                 
6 This result comes from the endogenous growth theories, or from knowledge economics.   
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3.2.3 In regard to complexity and to bilateral (and multilateral) dependency, it is possible to 
consider  the  following  situation:  there  are  two  firms  which  offer  the  complementary 
technological  process  to  use  a  determinate  technology.  For  example,  each  firm  offers  a 
specific algorithm, and the software production depends of these two different algorithms (it is 
possible to extend this reasoning to n firms). 
 
Lets us write the following equations: 
Pa = pa.qa + Ea/b                                                       (5) 
Pb = pb.qb + Eb/a                                                       (6) 
TC = pa.qa + pb.qb                                                     (7) 
 
With p as the price the firm sells the technology, q as the quantities sold and TC as the cost 
related  to  the  technology  acquisition.  Eb/a  represents  the  externality  produced  by  A  and 
endogeneized by B, Ea/b the externality produced by B and endogeneized by A. 
 
We  can  suppose  that,  in  a  first  time,  A  decreases  its  price;  in  regard  to  the  bilateral 
dependency, the firm which will buy the complete technological process will have to buy one 
segment  from  A  and  the  other  one  from  B.  If  B  maintains  its  prices  constant,  and  if  A 
decreases its price, Ea/b = 0, and Eb/a is positive; B benefits from the demand externalities 
produced by A, i. e., benefits of the demand increase produced by A. A produces a demand 
externality, which benefices to B
7. 
 
Coordination failures  appear:  the  price  decrease  depends  on  the  A  anticipations  about  B 
strategy (and vice-versa). The market is not systematically the most efficient mechanism: in 2, 
3 and 4, CT is higher than it would be in the case there was only one technology producer. In 
this case, it is possible to speak in technological costs sub-additively. This situation can be 
explained by opportunist behaviors form B, in the present situation. 
 
 
Table 1 – Coordination failures 
 
                       pa        pa constant 
 
  pb                 1              2 
 
pb constant        3              4 
 
 
 
 
The situation 1 corresponds to the market efficiency, in the way CT is minimized; all the other 
situations are sub-optimal, in the way CT isn´t minimized.  
 
                                                 
7 This is a demand externality, in the sense defined by the new-keynesian analyze.  
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In regard to  this  sub-optimality,  a  pigouvian tax  implementation  permits  to neutralize  the 
opportunist behavior (Rosenkranz S., Schmitz P.W., 2006): 
 
Pa = pa.qa                                                             (8) 
Pb = pb.qb + Eb/a – Tx                                                  (9) 
TC  = pa.qa + pb.qb                                                   (10) 
 
(TC as the technological cost, Tx as the pigouvian tax, and p as the marginal product) 
 
The Tx growth rate must be superior to qb growth rate to neutralize the positive externality 
Eb/a; such mechanism will incentive B to diminish its prices, and will be able to eliminate 
free-riders´ behavior. 
 
This  theoretical  result  is  paradoxical:  the  private  negotiation,  and  the  market  efficiency, 
cannot be implemented without the Government (or institutional) intervention. In other words, 
the  market  cannot  be  efficient  without  institutional  intervention;  this  one  is  necessary  to 
prevent the opportunist behaviors, and to maintain the social efficiency conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In  conclusion,  it  is  possible  to  affirm that  the  IPR  (and the  PR)  private  negotiation  isn´t 
systematically  the  most  efficient  social  instance:  in  regard  to  the  goods  specificities  and 
complexity, in regard to the asymmetries information which characterize these markets, the 
private solution limits appear soon.  
 
The transaction costs level produced by a market regulation is, in various situations, higher 
than the one produced by other kind of governance modality. The “neoclassical” analyzes 
limits may be explained from the fact that these analyzes don´t consider, or minimize, the 
transaction costs produced by a private regulation. In regard to the complexity, in the way I 
defined this concept, the pertinent problematic isn´t the one evaluated in terms of production 
costs and private costs; on the contrary, the analyze has to consider too the transaction costs 
and the collective costs related with these mechanisms. 
 
From  Coase´s  approach  limits,  this  paper  underlines  the  necessity  of  an  institutional 
component  to  regulate  the  market  activities,  and  to  specify  what  is  the  most  efficient 
governance modality to be adopted. From an institutional perspective, and more specifically 
from  the  “old  institutional”  approach,  this  means  that  the  market,  i.e  the  IPR  private 
negotiation modalities, can´t be conceived as an optimal mechanism and as an auto-regulatory 
instance. 
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Алан Герсковічі 
Економіка знань та інформації, благополуччя та державне регулювання: 
економічна природа прав інтелектуальної власності 
В  даній  статті  аналізуються  підходи  до  оцінки  економічної  природи  інтелектуальної 
власності  та  її  використання  з  урахуванням  економічної  категорії  благополуччя.  Зокрема  в 
статті  доведено,  що  транзакційні  витрати  використання  нематеріальних  активів,  зокрема 
прав  інтелектуальної  вартості  значно  перевищують  витрати  пов’язні  на  їх  державне 
регулювання.  Ефективність  державного  регулювання  (ліцензування,  обмеження,  контроль, 
власність  держави)  значно  перевищує  витрати  на  переговори  між  контрагентами  по 
впровадженню інтелектуальних прав власності. В дослідженнях «неокласиків» по просуванню 
інтелектуальних  прав  власності  враховуються  лише  витрати  на  виробництво,  проте 
транзакційні витрати ринкових механізмів не беруться до уваги. В роботі доведено, що підходи 
неокласичної економічної школи не можуть використовуватися для оцінки таких комплексних 
товарів як нематеріальні активи.  
Теоретичні результати дослідження полягають в тому, що приватні переговори та ринкова 
ефективність  використання  прав  інтелектуальної  власності  не  можуть  бути  досягнуті  без 
інституціонального втручання, тобто без державного регулювання, необхідного для підтримки  
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умов  соціальної  справедливості.  Проблема  забезпечення  ефективності  функціонування 
інтелектуальних прав власності полягає не лише в урахуванні виробничих витрат, а навпаки, 
необхідно брати до уваги транзакційні та колективні витрати. 
Враховуючи  всю  комплексність  нематеріального  капіталу  в  роботі  показано  обмеження 
теорії Коуза та обґрунтовано її відмінності з теорією Вільямсона для нематеріальних активів. 
Зокрема, що стосується теорії Коуза, доведено необхідність використання інституціонального 
посередника  та  регулятора  для  досягнення  соціальної  та  ринкової  ефективності.  Ринкові 
механізми довели свою низьку ефективність при регулюванні та функціонуванні такої категорії 
благ як нематеріальні активи. 
В  висновках  можна  стверджувати,  що  для  інтелектуальних  прав  власності  приватні 
переговори  та  ринкові  механізми  просування  зазначених  категорій  товарів  не  забезпечують 
бажаний соціальний ефект, основною причиною ринкових провалів можна назвати специфіку та 
комплексність нематеріальних активів, неповноту та асиметричність інформації. Проведений 
аналіз  може  бути  використаний  в  різних  сферах  пов’язаних  з  нематеріальними  активами: 
просування товарів екологічної спрямованості, культурні товари, освітні послуги, виробництво 
інформації, економіка Інтернету. 
Ключові  слова:  добробут,  інформаційна  економіка,  операційні  витрати,  права 
інтелектуальної власності, управління. 
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